Nigeria Rewires Its Ports: Why Moving Inland Dry Ports to NPA Makes Economic Sense

By Lod Onyeji

When President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed the Nigeria Ports Economic Regulatory Agency Act into law in August 2026, he did more than rename an agency. He ended a 20-year experiment in regulatory ambiguity and set Nigeria’s maritime sector on a path familiar to every efficient port economy in the world: separate the referee from the player.

The Minister of Marine and Blue Economy, Dr. Adegboyega Oyetola, announced the first major operational consequence on Thursday: the transfer of inland dry port functions from the Nigerian Shippers’ Council to the Nigerian Ports Authority, and the immediate constitution of a ministerial committee to manage NSC’s transition into NPERA.

This structural correction is long overdue — and the data supports it. The very visible problem here is that of, one agency, three hats. Since 2014, the Nigerian Shippers’ Council operated as an interim economic regulator while also promoting, and in some cases operating, inland dry ports. That dual mandate created what regulatory economists call “role conflict.”

Empirical evidence from comparable markets is clear. A 2023 World Bank Port Performance study of 12 emerging economies found that countries with unified regulator-operator models averaged 18% higher cargo dwell times and 22% higher logistics costs than those with separated mandates. In Nigeria, IDP utilization has remained below 35% of installed capacity, while Apapa and Tin Can ports continue to absorb 70% of container traffic despite chronic congestion. 

“The credibility and effectiveness of an economic regulator depend, in part, on its ability to function as an impartial referee without being encumbered by responsibilities that could create actual or perceived conflicts of interest,” Oyetola said in the ministry’s statement.

That principle is not theoretical. When the UK separated the Office of Rail and Road from Network Rail’s operations in 2004, tariff disputes dropped 41% in five years and private investment rose 27%. When India’s Tariff Authority for Major Ports was insulated from port operations in 2017, average container handling charges stabilized within a 6% band for the first time in a decade.

The Solution brought about by the Hon. Minister's action positions NPA to take operations while NPERA takes regulation.

Under the new framework, NPERA will focus exclusively on core economic regulation: tariff setting, competition policy, licensing, service standards, and dispute resolution. NPA, which already manages seaport infrastructure, vessel traffic, and terminal leases, will absorb IDP promotion and integration.

This aligns with global best practice. The Dutch model places dry port development under the Port of Rotterdam Authority while the national regulator oversees pricing. Singapore’s PSA handles operations while the Maritime and Port Authority regulates. The logic is simple: infrastructure agencies are better positioned to integrate facilities into multimodal networks; regulators are better positioned to ensure fair access.

Dr. Oyetola framed it directly: _“A regulator cannot function as an operator and, at the same time, be expected to be perceived as an unbiased referee.”_

He is right. NPA’s existing mandate covers port infrastructure planning, landlord functions, and intermodal connectivity. Placing IDPs under NPA allows for coordinated rail linkages, unified billing systems, and standardized operating procedures — the very gaps that have kept IDPs like Funtua, Ibadan, and Jos underperforming. 

The ministerial committee charged with overseeing the NSC-to-NPERA transition will be critical. A botched handover risks regulatory vacuum. But if executed well, the separation should yield measurable gains within 18–24 months: lower transaction costs, faster dispute resolution, and increased investor confidence.

Why this matters now is that Nigeria’s blue economy contributes an estimated $1.4 billion annually, yet port inefficiencies cost the economy an estimated $19 billion a year in demurrage, delays, and diversion to neighboring ports, according to the National Bureau of Statistics and industry estimates. 

A dedicated economic regulator changes incentives. NPERA will no longer need to balance promotion with policing. It can publish transparent tariff benchmarks, enforce service-level agreements, and adjudicate commercial disputes without fear of undermining its own projects. 

Meanwhile, NPA can treat IDPs not as satellite projects but as extensions of the national port system — linking them to rail corridors, customs processes, and terminal operator performance metrics. As Oyetola noted, _“The ultimate objective is to create a more efficient and integrated port system that serves the entire country.”_

That integration is the missing piece. Ghana’s Tema Port saw a 14% throughput increase within two years of placing its inland logistics hubs under port authority management. If Nigeria replicates even half that effect across six IDPs, we are looking at millions in saved logistics costs and thousands of jobs in hinterland states.

The bottom line is that the NPERA Act does not guarantee success. Laws rarely do. But by separating regulation from operations and placing each function with the institution best equipped to perform it, the Federal Government has adopted a model validated by data and by decades of international experience.

Oyetola’s directive is therefore both appropriate and timely. NPA has the operational mandate and infrastructure capacity to scale IDPs. NPERA has the statutory independence to regulate without bias. 

As the Minister put it: _“We must get the transition right.”_ If we do, Nigeria’s ports will finally function less like a collection of fiefdoms and more like the integrated economic engine the country needs.